(19X5') proposed a "consensual" structure of affect based on J. A. Russell's (1980) circumplcx. The authors" review of the literature indicates that this 2-factor model captures robust structural properties of self-rated mood. Nevertheless, the evidence also indicates that the circumplcx does not fit the data closely and needs to be refined. Most notably, the model's dimensions are not entirely independent: moreover, with the exception of Pleasantness-Unpleasantness, they are not completely bipolar. More generally, the data suggest a model that falls somewhere between classic simple structure and a true circumplex. The authors then examine two of the dimensions imbedded in this structure, which they label Negative Activation (NA) and Positive Activation (PA). The authors argue that PA and NA represent the subjective components of broader biobchavioral systems of approach and withdrawal, respectively. The authors conclude by demonstrating how this framework helps to clarify various affect-related phenomena, including circadian rhythms, sleep, and the mood disorders.
The Affect Circumplex

Historical Overview
The model proposed by Watson and Tellegen (1985) was itself the product of a long line of research into the basic dimensions of affect (for historical reviews, see Russell. 1980; Watson & Tellegen, 1985) . Although some of the earlier models argued for the existence of three major dimensions (e.g., Engen, Levy, & Schlosberg, 1958) , affect researchers gradually converged on a two-factor structure. Specifically, analyses of facia! and vocal emotional expressions, judged similarities among mood words, and semantic differential ratings of mood terms all suggested the existence of two general dimensions: Pleasantness versus Unpleasantness and Activation or Arousal (see Russell, 1979 Russell, , 1980 . In 1980, Russell made a major contribution to this literature by proposing that these two dimensions define a circumpiex, that is, a model in which mood descriptors can be systematically arranged around the perimeter of a circle. In essence, this affect circumplex contained four bipolar dimensions that were spaced 45° apart: Pleasantness (pleasure vs. misery), Excitement (excitement vs. depression), Activation (arousal vs. sleepiness), and Distress (distress vs. contentment; see Russell, 1980, Figure 1, p. 1 164) . It must be emphasized, however, that Russell continued to view Pleasantness and Activation as the basic dimensions of affect.
Although Russell (1980) presented some evidence suggesting that this circumplex also characterized self-reported mood, most of the available data suggested that self-ratings actually were characterized by a much larger number (typically from 5 to 11) of relatively small factors (see Watson & Tellegen, 1985, pp. 219-220) . However, by reanalyzing the data from these studies, Watson and Tellegen (1985) were able to demonstrate that the same basic two-dimensional structure also consistently emerged in self-report data; it was this robustness across different types of evidence that led Watson and Tellegen to declare this structure to be "basic."
Moreover, on the basis of these reanalyzed data, they presented a circular structure that was designed to resemble Russell's circumplex as closely as possible. This structure is displayed in Figure 1 . Paralleling Russell's model, Watson and Tellegen's structure depicts four bipolar dimensions that are spaced 45° apart: Pleasantness (happy vs. sad). Positive Affect (excited vs. sluggish). Engagement (aroused vs. still), and Negative Affect (distressed vs. relaxed)-In contrast to Russell, however, Watson and Tellegen emphasized the importance of the Negative Affect and Positive Affect dimensions that are depicted by the solid lines in Figure 1 .
Although Watson and Tellegen's (1985) circle was designed to resemble Russell's (1980) circumplex, a close inspection reveals that the two structures are not identical. The two schemes do show very close agreement across the five-octant arc that defines the upper half of the circle depicted in Figure 1 . However, whereas Figure 1 places terms such as sad and depressed in the Unpleasantness octant, Russell moved them 45° to Low Positive Affect. Moreover, Russell viewed sleepv as a marker of Disengagement rather than of Low Positive Affect. Despite these inconsistencies, the two models generally are quite similar, and we emphasize this similarity throughout most of this article. Nevertheless, it also is apparent that they define somewhat different structures, so that one of them actually may fit the available data better than the other. Accordingly, we will consider these models separately when examining the overall validity of the circumplex.
We also must briefly consider two later adaptations of this affect circumplex. First, in a widely cited article, Larsen and Diener (1992, Figure 2 .1) presented a circumplex that was adapted from those of Russell (1980) and Watson and Tellegen (1985) . A close inspection of this model, however, indicates that it essentially defines the same structure as the one displayed in Figure 1 . Specifically, of the 38 terms depicted in Figure 1 . 27 also were included in Larsen and Diener's circumplex. Of these 27. 26 (96%) were placed in exactly the same octants as in Figure 1 (the lone exception is that Larsen and Diener moved active 45° to the Engagement octant). Thus, for the purposes of this article, we will treat the Watson and Tellegen and Larsen and Diener circles as defining the same structure.
Second. Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998) presented a revised and updated circumplex that appears to represent an amalgam of these earlier schemes, combining idiosyncratic elements from each of them. For instance, unlike Russell (1980) -but consistent with the structure depicted in Figure 1 -terms such as tired and sluggish now are viewed as indicators of Low Positive Affect rather than of Disengagement. On the other hand, unlike Figure 1 -but consistent with Russell (1980) -sleepy is considered to be a manifestation of Disengagement (see Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998, Appendix A) . Once again, although these differences seem relatively minor, they nevertheless may influence the model's ability to fit the empirical data, such that this scheme may fit the data better-or worse-than those presented by Russell and Watson and Tellegen (1985) . A. Tellegen. 1985, Psychological Bulletin, 98, p. 221. Copyright 1985 by the American Psychological Association.
Empirical Status of the Affect Circumplex
Problems with the schematic model. As we have discussed, this circumplex purportedly represents the basic structure of affect at the higher order level. It is important to note, therefore, that an extensive body of evidence has demonstrated the basic validity of this model. To date, the bulk of its support has come from exploratory factor analyses of self-report mood data, which consistently have demonstrated the existence of two general factors, not one or three. It is noteworthy, moreover, that the same two general factors-corresponding to the Negative Affect and Positive Affect dimensions shown in Figure 1 -have been identified across different sets of descriptors, time frames, response formats, and rotational schemes, and in both within-and between-subjects analyses (see Almagor & Ben-Porath, 1989 : Mayer & Gaschke. 1988 Watson & Clark, 1997) .
Furthermore, confirmatory factor analytic and structural modeling data consistently have corroborated key aspects of this structure. Most notably, the Figure 1 model clearly posits the existence of both (a) a bipolar Pleasantness-Unpleasantness dimension (which opposes positively vs. negatively valenced affects along a single axis) as well as (b) separable dimensions of Negative Affect and Positive Affect (which place positively and negatively valenced affects onto different axes). Several studies now have confirmed the existence of all of these dimensions within the same set of self-report data (e.g., Feldman Barrett & Russell. 1998: Tellegen, Watson. & Clark, in press ).
Thus, considerable evidence supports key aspects of the structure displayed in Figure 1 . Nevertheless, it recently has become apparent that this model ultimately fails to fit the empirical data well. For instance, Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998, Study 3) conducted three separate confirmatory factor analyses to determine whether variables representing the four bipolar dimensions of Figure 1 actually defined the posited two-dimensional structure (see their "joint structure" analyses and the accompanying Table  9 ). It is important that all three analyses demonstrated that the model did not fit the data well. Specifically, on the basis of the parameters reported by Feldman Barrett and Russell, we computed the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Browne & Cudeck. 1993 ), a widely used fit index that rewards parsimony in model specification. According to Browne and Cudeck (1993) , RMSEA values of .05 or less indicate a close fit, values in the .05-.08 range indicate a reasonable fit, and values of. 10 or greater demonstrate a poor fit. In the three analyses reported by Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998) , the RMSEA values were .135, .131, and .106, respectively, indicating a consistently poor fit.
As noted earlier, Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998) tested a circumplex model that differed slightly from the ones examined by both Russell (1980) and Watson and Tellegen (1985) . Consequently, it could be argued that one of these earlier models might fit the data better. Our own analyses, however, reveal that these earlier schemes similarly fail to yield an acceptably close fit. Specifically, we now have conducted analyses of three different data sets using Browne's (1992) CIRCUM procedure, a structural modeling technique for testing circumplexity (see also Fabrigar, Visser, & Browne, 1997) . In each case, we designated the High Positive Affect octant of Figure 1 as the reference variable (i.e., fixed its location on the circle at 0°) and used the maximum likelihood method to fit the model.
Two of these analyses explicitly tested the structure depicted in Figure 1 . The first analysis (Sample 1) was based on the responses of 486 undergraduates who rated their current, momentary affect; the second (Sample 2) involved 317 students who completed a general, trait version of the same questionnaire. In both samples, respondents rated the extent to which they had experienced each mood descriptor on a 5-point scale, where 1 = very slightly or not at all and 5 = extremely.
Respondents in both samples rated themselves on the 38 affect terms depicted in Figure 1 . The descriptors defining each octant then were summed to yield an overall measure of that octant; note, however, that two terms (placid and quiescent) had to be dropped because many respondents were unfamiliar with them and left them blank. These eight scales then were submitted to separate CIRCUM analyses of each data set. We initially tested constrained models in which the polar angles were forced to be equally spaced around the circle (i.e., 45° apart, as they appear in Figure 1 ), and the minimum correlation was set at -1.00. These constrained models yielded an extremely poor fit: For the momentary data, X 2 (18. N = 486) = 495.71, p < .005. RMSEA = .234; for the general data, * 2 (18, N = 317) = 509.66, p < .005, RMSEA = .294. We therefore tested a second pair of models in which these constraints were removed (i.e.. the variables were free to be placed more-or less-than 45° apart, and there was no constraint on the minimum correlation). The model now fit the data marginally well in the momentary ratings, * 2 (8, N = 486) = 42.43, p < .005, RMSEA = .094, but continued to fare rather poorly in the general ratings. r(8. N = 317) = 46.80, p < .005. RMSEA = .124.
The third analysis (Sample 3) tested Russell's version of the circumplex in a sample of 421 University of Iowa undergraduates who rated their current, momentary mood on the same 5-point scale. Using the terms presented in Russell (1980) and Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998) as a guide, we constructed 3-or 4-item scales to assess each octant. Specifically, the scales consisted of active, enthusiastic, excited, fit (High Positive Affect); aroused, wide awake, alert (Engagement); scared, nervous, jittery (High Negative Affect); unhappy, distressed, downhearted (Unpleasantness) ; gloomy, blue, sad, discouraged (Low Positive Affect); sleepy, drowsy, tired, sluggish (Disengagement); rested, calm, relaxed, tranquil (Low Negative Affect); and happy, pleasant, content, satisfied (Pleasantness) . As before, we began by testing a constrained model that fit the data quite poorly, )f(l&, N = 421) = 663.63, p < .005, RMSEA = .292. We then tested a second model in which these constraints were lifted, but this again indicated that the fit was poor, ^(8, N = 421) = 90.41. p < .005, RMSEA = .157.
Thus, all of the major conceptualizations of the circumplex have been found wanting, even after key assumptions (such as equal spacing around the perimeter of the circle) are relaxed. Clearly, the neat schematic depicted in Figure 1 fails to capture the complexities of real-world data. What has gone wrong? In answering this question, we begin by noting two important findings that have emerged in these data. First, it is apparent that once one has controlled for both random and systematic sources of error, the major dimensions of the model are not, strictly speaking, independent (i.e., 90° apart) of one another. On the one hand, it appears that the Pleasantness and Activation dimensions are positively correlated; Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998) , for example, reported correlations in the .10-.25 range across their various con-firmatory factor analyses. On the other hand, it appears that the Positive Affect and Negative Affect dimensions are moderately negatively correlated; in three different studies, the error-corrected correlation between the latent dimensions was estimated to be -.43 (Tellegen et al., in press) , -.44 (Diener, Smith, & Fujita, 1995) , and -.46 (Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998) .
Second, although the Pleasantness dimension has emerged as quasi-bipolar in these analyses, the bipolarity of the remaining axes has proven to be more problematic. After controlling for measurement error, terms defining the opposite poles of these dimensions should correlate close to -1.00 with one another. In the case of Pleasantness-Unpleasantness, this prediction consistently has been confirmed. For instance, Tellegen et al. (in press ) obtained a corrected correlation of -.91 between markers of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness; similarly, Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998) Refining the model. Earlier, we reviewed evidence demonstrating that other key elements of the model are well established and clearly reflect robust properties of self-rated affect. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the neat schematic shown in Figure 1 fails to capture some of the complexities in the empirical data. It therefore is crucial that researchers continue to refine this twodimensional model so that it better captures the nature of realworld affective experience. What sort of structure actually emerges in these data? To address this issue, in Table 1 we present CIRCUM's parameter estimates of the polar angles for the octant scales in each of our three samples; it also indicates whether this polar angle deviates significantly from the hypothesized model Note. Ms = 486 (Sample 1), 317 (Sample 2), and 421 (Sample 3). Samples 1 and 3 are based on momentary mood ratings; Sample 2 is based on general mood ratings. Samples 1 and 2 test Watson and Tellegen's (1985) model; Sample 3 tests Russell's (1980) model. ' The polar angle deviates significantly from the hypothesized model.
(i.e., whether the 95% confidence interval for the angle contains the value that is hypothesized in Figure 1 ). Figure 2 . In interpreting these results, it should be recalled that Figure 1 places these variables at regular 45° intervals, so that Engagement should be at 45°, High Negative Affect at 90°, Unpleasantness at 135°, and so on.
These data clearly demonstrate that the Figure 1 schematic both (a) captures important properties of mood ratings but (b) fai|s to provide a close fit to the actual data. It is noteworthy that the Engagement-Disengagement axis is associated with the greatest distortion, as both ends of this dimension consistently deviated from their predicted position in the circumplex (the Engagement scale is misplaced by an average of 21°, whereas Disengagement deviates by an average of 25°). More generally, the distortions are not random but rather are quite systematic. Note that the Disengagement and Low Positive Affect markers are displaced toward Unpleasantness and High Negative Affect; these latter scales are shifted toward each other, so that they are only 25° apart (instead of the hypothesized 45°). Similarly, Low Negative Affect and Engagement are shifted toward Pleasantness/High Positive Affect, which are only 34° apart.
All of this movement has the net effect of creating two broad "superclusters"; the first (spanning from High Negative Affect to Disengagement) occupies only 100° of the circle, whereas the second (ranging from Low Negative Affect to Engagement) occupies only 105°. These clusters are separated by two large gaps at opposite ends of the space (76° between Engagement and High Negative Affect, 79° between Disengagement and Low Negative Affect); these gaps emerge because no variables fall close to the hypothesized Engagement-Disengagement axis. In other words, none of these variables is affectively neutral; rather, all of them can be characterized as either positively or negatively valenced, at least to some degree. More generally-and consistent with the data reported by Russell and Feldman Barrett (1999) -these results indicate that affective structure actually falls somewhere between classic simple structure (in which the variables should cluster in dense groups) and a true circumplex (in which the variables should be equally spaced and define a complete circle). These CIRCUM analyses are based entirely on betweensubjects data, which are subject to systematic errors such as the acquiescence response bias (see Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998; Green, Goldman, & Salovey, 1993; Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1994, in press ). Consequently, it is important to examine the structural properties of within-subject data in which such errors have been controlled. We therefore examined data from three intensive intraindividual studies of mood. Participants in the first sample ("Moment Data-SMU") were 226 Southern Methodist University (SMU) undergraduates who rated their current mood once per day for 45 days (M = 45.0 observations per respondent; overall N = 10,169 observations). The second sample ("Daily Data-SMU") consisted of 254 SMU students who rated their daily mood once per day for 6-7 weeks (M = 44.6 observations per respondent; overall N = 11,323 observations). Finally, participants in the third sample ("Daily Data-Iowa") were 135 University of Iowa undergraduates who rated their daily mood once per day for approximately 7 weeks (M = 48.8 observations per respondent; overall N = 6,593 observations). To eliminate all between-subjects variance, we standardized these ratings (M = 0, SD = 1) on a within-subject basis and collapsed them across all of the participants in each sample. This permitted us to compute average within-subject correlations in each data set that then could be subjected to P-technique factor analyses. All of these respondents rated themselves on the Expanded Form of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994) , a 60-item questionnaire that contains good markers of seven of the eight octants depicted in Figure 1 (only Disengagement is not assessed). We used the original 10-item Positive and Negative Affect scales from the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to assess the High Positive Affect and High Negative Affect octants, respectively. In addition, we used the 5-item Sadness scale (sad, blue, downhearted, alone, lonely) to assess Unpleasantness, the 4-item Fatigue scale (sleepy, tired, sluggish, drowsy) to measure Low Positive Affect, the 3-item Serenity scale (calm, relaxed, at ease) to measure Low Negative Affect, and the 3-item Surprise scale (surprised, amazed, astonished) to assess Engagement. Finally, we summed four items from the PANAS-X Joviality scale (happy, joyful, cheerful, delighted) to measure Pleasantness.
We subjected these seven octant markers to a separate P-technique factor analysis (principal-factor analysis with squared multiple correlations in the diagonal) in each sample; we extracted two factors in each solution and rotated them using varimax. The rotated loadings from each solution are presented in Table 2 ; in addition, the loadings from the momentary mood solution are plotted in Figure 3 . These data replicate the CIRCUM results and again demonstrate mixed support for the affect circumplex. On the one hand-and consistent with the model-clearly recognizable bipolar dimensions of Positive Affect (i.e., High Positive Affect, Pleasantness, and Engagement vs. Low Positive Affect) and Negative Affect (i.e., High Negative Affect and Unpleasantness vs. Low Negative Affect and Pleasantness) emerged in all three solutions.
On the other hand, several aspects of the data are inconsistent with the model. First, the bipolarity of the Positive Affect dimension is much stronger in the moment data than in the daily data (a point we consider subsequently). Second, consistent with the CIRCUM results, Engagement obviously is not affectively neutral but rather is positively valenced and shifted toward the Positive Affect axis. Third, Unpleasantness has unexpectedly low (negative) loadings on Positive Affect, whereas High Positive Affect has unexpectedly high (negative) loadings on Negative Affect. Taken together, these findings suggest that the gaps between (a) Pleasantness and High Positive Affect and (b) Unpleasantness and High Negative Affect are not quite as large as Figure 1 indicates; this is confirmed in Figure 3 , which shows that the two sets of scales actually cluster close to one another.
More generally-and replicating Figure 2- Figure 3 again suggests the presence of two "superclusters," one consisting of Low Positive Affect, Unpleasantness, and High Negative Affect and the other composed of Pleasantness, High Positive Affect, and Engagement. Furthermore, we again see a gap indicating that no variables fall directly on the hypothesized Engagement axis. Finally, consistent with previous research in this area (e.g., Feldman, 1995; Russell, 1980) , Figure 3 demonstrates that affect self-ratings actually tend to form an ellipse rather than a circle; this reflects the Once again, we emphasize that key features of the affect circumplex (such as the existence of a bipolar valence dimension, as well as separable dimensions of Positive Affect and Negative Affect) are well established and clearly reflect robust properties of seli'-rated affect. We certainly are not advocating that this model be scrapped altogether. However, as stated earlier, we believe that it is time to refine this structure so as to address the problems we have noted (such as the unequal spacing of the hypothesized markers and the absence of variables along the EngagementDisengagement axis) and to fit the empirical data more closely. We therefore recently proposed a modified three-level hierarchical structure that retains the essential features of our old model but that abandons the rigid schematic eircumplex of Figure work. Finally, the lowest level of the hierarchy consists of the specific, discrete affects that long have been the principal concern of emotion theorists (see Tellegen et al., in press , for more details). Finally, before leaving this topic, we must emphasize a key point: Although affect ratings show some highly robust structural properties (e.g., the same dimensions of Positive and Negative Affect have emerged across a very wide range of assessment conditions), it is unreasonable to posit a single, highly precise "structure" of affect that can fit the data maximally well in all possible contexts. The observed structure of affect necessarily reflects the underlying processes that are influencing the ratings, and these processes can be expected to change in different contexts. Put another way, the "true" correlation between two constructs can be expected to vary, even after controlling for measurement error and other potential problems. For instance, the correlation between measures of Negative Affect and Positive Affect increases significantly during episodes of strong, intense emotion (Diener & Iran-Nejad, 1986; . This effect likely occurs because extreme levels on one dimension generally are incompatible with strong activation on the other (a point we consider subsequently).
The bipolarity of the Positive Affect dimension offers a particularly striking example of structural instability. The data reported in Table 2 suggest that the bipolarity of the dimension is much stronger in ratings of current, momentary mood than in ratings of daily mood. To document this point further, we calculated average within-subject correlations among our Positive Affect, Negative Affect, Fatigue (i.e.. low Positive Affect), and Serenity (i.e., low Negative Affect) scales in four large data sets. Three of the samples were described previously in conjunction with Table 2 ; the fourth ("Moment Data-Iowa") consisted of 120 University of Iowa undergraduates who rated their current mood every two waking hours over the course of a week (M = 52.1 observations per respondent; overall N = 6,254 observations). Thus, we have two large samples (one from SMU, the other from Iowa) for each type of rating.
The average within-subject correlations from these four samples are reported in Table 3 . The most striking aspect of these data is that the correlation between Positive Affect and Fatigue consistently is much stronger in the momentary ratings (rs = -.62 and -.67) than in the daily ratings (rs = -.41 and -.41). It is noteworthy that the correlation between Negative Affect and Serenity was slightly higher in the daily data, which suggests that there was no general bias operating against bipolarity in these ratings. We suspect that this enormous difference in the FatiguePositive Affect correlation largely reflects the fact that circadian rhythms (which we discuss later) strongly influence momentarybut not daily-mood ratings. As we will see, Positive Affect and Fatigue both are carried along the same circadian wave, thereby strengthening the association between them.
Terminological and Methodological Issues
Naming the dimensions. We next examine two important issues that need to be considered in future work on this structure. The first concerns the ongoing controversy regarding how the four dimensions shown in Figure 1 should be named. Larsen and Diener (1992) initiated this controversy by arguing that the labels Negative Affect and Positive Affect were misleading and should be eliminated (for a response to some of their objections, see Watson & Clark, 1997) . They proposed instead a labeling system in which all of the octants were defined in terms of Pleasantness and Activation. For instance, in their terminological scheme, High Positive Affect would be renamed Activated Pleasant Affect, whereas Low Positive Affect becomes Unactivated Unpleasant Affect. This terminology since has been adopted by other researchers, such as Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998) .
This terminological scheme makes perfect sense if one assumes that Pleasantness and Activation are the basic dimensions of affect. Put another way, defining the octants as combinations of Pleasantness and Activation makes sense only if one assumes that these dimensions are the basic defining features of affect. Because we do not agree that this is the case (or, at least, that this has been clearly established empirically), we cannot support the use of this terminology. Indeed, in our view it eliminates one of the most attractive features of the scheme used in Figure 1 , namely, that the two major alternative rotations are given equal weight through the use of two different labeling schemes (i.e., Pleasantness-Engagement on the one hand vs. Positive Affect-Negative Affect on the other).
Still, there is no point in retaining the Figure 1 terminology if some of its labels are inaccurate or misleading. Are the labels Negative Affect and Positive Affect, in fact, misleading? In our view, the most serious criticism of these names is that they misrepresent the actual valence of these dimensions (see Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998) . That is, although the name Positive Affect implies that it is a dimension reflecting fluctuations in positively valenced mood states, Figure 1 indicates that it actually contains unpleasant, negatively valenced terms (e.g., dull, sluggish) at its low pole. In parallel fashion, the Negative Affect dimension-which should tap variations in negatively valenced states-actually includes pleasant, positively valenced affects (e.g., relaxed, calm) at its low end.
Although this objection has some merit, we have not found it persuasive, for two reasons. First, although a simple schematic model (such as Figure 1) gives equal weight to both ends of these dimensions, we believe that their high poles actually are much more important. An inspection of the most prominent inventories that assess mood at the specific affect level-such as the Mood Adjective Check List (Nowlis, 1965) , the Differential Emotions Scale (Izard, Dougherty, Bloxom, & Kotsch, 1974) , the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List-Revised (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1985) , the Profile of Mood States (McNair, Lorr. & Droppleman, 1971) , and our own PANAS-X-indicates that they contain many more high-activation terms than low-activation terms. The discrepancy is particularly dramatic when one considers negatively valenced terms. The High Negative Affect octant in Figure 1 actually subsumes a very broad range of content, including numerous terms related to the basic emotions of fear (e.g., fearful), anger (e.g., angry), disgust (e.g., disgusted), contempt (e.g., scornful), guilt (e.g., guilty) and shame (e.g., ashamed)', in contrast, the Low Negative Affect octant contains a relatively small number of terms reflecting relaxation and serenity. Consequently, in a probabilistic sense, it remains true that the Negative Affect and Positive Affect dimensions are predominantly defined by negatively valenced and positively valenced terms, respectively.
Second, as our view of these dimensions has evolved, we increasingly have come to see them as truly unipolar constructs that essentially are defined by their high poles. As we discuss in greater detail shortly, we now view these dimensions as reflecting two basic biobehavioral systems of activation. As such, the activated, high ends of the dimensions fully capture their essential qualities. Moreover, although terms such as sluggish and relaxed can be used to characterize low levels on these dimensions in certain contexts, they do not intrinsically define the dimensions themselves. This is because the low poles of these dimensions ultimately reflect the absence of a particular kind of activation rather than the presence of a certain affective state (such as sluggishness or relaxation). Given that these dimensions are defined by their activated ends, we again would argue that the labels Negative Affect and Positive Affect are not misleading.
Nevertheless, it also has become obvious that these terms fail to convey the activated nature of these dimensions adequately. Therefore, in light of the evidence we consider later, we believe that the labels Negative Activation (or NA) and Positive Activation (or PA) provide a better, more accurate representation of these dimensions. These new labels also underscore the close affinity between the PA and NA dimensions and Thayer's (1989) influential constructs of Energetic Arousal and Tense Arousal, respectively (although our labels emphasize, in addition, the broad hedonic contrast between the two activation dimensions). We therefore will adopt this terminology throughout the remainder of this article.
Modeling measurement error. The second key issue concerns measurement error and the role it may play in structural data. Although mood researchers have been concerned with the potential effects of random and systematic error for many years (e.g., Bentler, 1969; Diener & Emmons, 1984; Russell, 1979 Russell, , 1980 , most of the work in this area has been based on raw, uncorrected data (e.g., in exploratory factor analysis). In an influential article, however. Green et al. (1993) challenged this practice, arguing that by failing to account for measurement error, analyses of uncorrected data yielded a highly distorted and misleading view of affective structure. To support this assertion, Green et al. conducted a series of analyses demonstrating that the bipolarity of the Pleasantness dimension became substantially stronger after accounting for random and systematic error. Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998) echoed this sentiment, arguing that results such as these have "delivered the coup de grace to all research in which conclusions are based directly on the observed correlation between measures of affect" (p. 5).
We entirely agree that measurement error can significantly distort observed correlations and, therefore, that it is important to model both random and nonrandom sources of error in future work in this area. Nevertheless, we also must voice two concerns regarding how this issue has been examined in the contemporary literature. First, although error is undeniably important, its effects have been overstated by some recent writers (for a more detailed discussion of this point, see Watson & Clark, 1997) . For instance, in discussing the results of their Study 1, Green et al. (1993) pointed out that an observed correlation of -.25 was transformed to a latent correlation of -.84 after controlling for error (see p. 1033). In summarizing Green et al.'s findings, Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998) emphasized this same point, noting that "In one dramatic example, the correlation between observed scores of happiness and those on sadness was -.25; the correlation between their latent scores was estimated to be -.84" (p. 968).
The problem with these examples is that this -.25 value does not accurately reflect the true nature of the observed correlations. Indeed, the mean uncorrected correlation in these data (after r-to-z transformation) was -.53, which already indicates a substantial degree of overlap. Moreover, Green et al. (1993) also reported that simply summing the observed measures into aggregate scores yielded a raw correlation of -.72. More generally, our inspection of the relevant literature suggests that controlling for measurement error can be expected to transform (a) low correlations into moderate correlations and (b) moderate to strong correlations into very strong correlations but that it will not turn (c) low correlations into strong correlations. As an example of (a), in analyzing the relation between positive and negative mood states, Tellegen et al. (1994) found 'that uncorrected correlations ranging from -.12 to -.25 yielded a latent correlation of -.43 after controlling for both random and systematic error. Similarly, Diener et al. (1995) reported that observed correlations ranging from .04 to -.28 corresponded to a latent value of -.44. As an example of (b), Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998. Study 2) reported that raw, uncorrected correlations (between measures of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness) ranging from -.66 to -.86 (M = -.77) corresponded to a latent correlation of -.93 and that raw correlations (between measures of high and low Activation) ranging from -.33 to -.66 (M = -.54) yielded a latent correlation of -.80.
Our second concern involves how error has been modeled in the contemporary literature. Although other approaches have also been used (e.g., Diener et al., 1995; Tellegen et al., 1994, in press ), the most popular strategy has been to adopt a multiformat approach in which a variety of different formats (e.g., adjective checklist, Likert rating scales) are used to measure the same constructs (e.g., Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998; Green et al., 1993) . If properly used, this multiformat approach can provide an excellent way of modeling-and eliminating-both random and systematic sources of error (for a detailed discussion, see Green et al., 1993) .
The problem with this approach-which has not been readily acknowledged in the contemporary literature-is that it requires that investigators create multiple "parallel forms" of the same constructs, which is not an easy or straightforward task. The ever-present danger is that systematic differences in content will emerge across the various formats, thereby distorting the results (and, in turn, presenting a distorted picture of the model being tested). As one example, Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998) Figure 1 ) using three different formats. For instance, using a unipolar Likert rating format, they created a scale consisting of the terms relaxed, at rest, serene, calm, and at ease. An inspection of Figure 1 indicates that this scale captures the content of the octant quite nicely.
Unfortunately, the scales created for the other two formats are less satisfactory. For instance, the parallel 5-item measure in the agree-disagree format contains the item "I'm feeling pleasantly well-rested"; the insertion of the word pleasantly in this context would seem to displace the scale toward the Pleasantness octant (which includes the term pleasant) in Figure 1 . This problem appears to be exacerbated in their 6-item scale in the "Describes Me" format, which contains both "I feel pleasantly at rest" and "I feel comfortable and content" (note that content also is a marker of Pleasantness in Figure 1 ). Thus, rather than being unambiguous measures of Low Negative Affect, these scales also appear to contain a substantial component of Pleasantness. In ordinary usage, this level of distortion might not be problematic; when one is testing a precise model in confirmatory factor analysis, however, it may produce misleading results (e.g.. in this particular case, it might help to explain why the corrected correlation between high and low Negative Affect failed to approach -1.00).
This problem represents a special case of the more general process of construct validation. As Cronbach and Meehl (1955) rightly noted, the process of construct validation involves both (a) articulating a set of constructs that arc embedded in a larger nomological network and (b) developing a series of observable measures that enable one to subject this theoretical model to empirical scrutiny. If the theory is confirmed, then this "bootstraps" one's confidence in every aspect of the network, including both the underlying constructs and the observable measures. If the theory is diseonfirmed. however, then the problem could exist anywhere within the network: It could reflect problems in the underlying theory, but it also could represent difficulties in the operationalization of the measures. Viewed in this light, we suggest that researchers need to establish the construct validity of their measures with greater care before using them to test the adequacy of these precise structural models. We may find that our models (such as the one shown in Figure 1 ) actually fit the data well when highly valid measures are used.
The Two Activation Systems of Affect
Which Dimensions Are "Basic"?
The circular structure displayed in Figure 1 includes four general bipolar dimensions. More precisely, it contains two different pairs of quasi-independent axes (Pleasantness-Activation and PA-NA), each of which defines an orderly two-dimensional space. As has repeatedly been noted in the recent literature, these paired axes therefore represent alternative conceptualizations of the same basic structure (e.g., Feldman Barrett & Russell. 1998; Larsen & Diener, 1992; Meyer & Shack, 1989; Watson & Tellegen, 1985) . This, in turn, has led to a question that has been frequently asked-but never adequately answered-in the mood literature: Which pair of axes actually reflects the fundamental, "basic" dimensions of affect?
We believe that this question is both unanswerable and unproductive. In our view, both sets of axes reflect important aspects of affective experience. For instance, as we discuss shortly, the PA and NA dimensions represent the subjective components of more general biobehavioral systems that have evolved to handle key adaptive tasks. Note, however, that similar arguments could be mustered in support of the Pleasantness and Activation axes. For example, various theorists have argued that as part of the evolution of the basic emotions, animals have developed a fundamental, innate tendency to appraise ongoing events and experiences as either "good" (i.e., opportunities) or "bad" (i.e.. threats or dangers; e.g.. Lazarus, 1991; Nesse. 1991) . Indeed, valence is such a salient aspect of our appraisal process that humans almost instantaneously evaluate their ongoing state as either pleasant/positive or unpleasant/negative, even in deactivated states. For instance, if a person currently is feeling very little-and appraises this situation as satisfactory-then he or she would use terms such as calm and relaxed (reflecting a pleasant state of deactivalion) to describe the experience. Conversely, if the situation is deemed to be somewhat unsatisfactory, then terms such as bored and dull (representing an unpleasant state of deactivation) would be used. We suspect that this innate and essentially universal classifactory response helps to explain the robust emergence of a general PleasantnessUnpleasantness dimension in self-report data.
Therefore, both pairs of axes arguably are "basic" in some sense. Indeed, we may view them as alternative explanatory schemes with somewhat different "ranges of convenience" (Kelly. 1955) . That is. each model could be maximally useful for understanding and explaining different sets of phenomena (see also Larsen & Diener. 1992 ).
Whv Focus on Positive and Negative Activation?
Nevertheless, as is apparent from our previous work in this area (e.g.. Watson & Clark. 1997; Watson & Tellegen, 1985) , we generally find the model defined by the PA and NA axes to be particularly useful. The reason for this, in part, is that we have found these dimensions to provide a highly parsimonious explanation of certain affect-related phenomena, such as the cyclic data we discuss shortly. Beyond that, we also offer two general considerations. First, we believe that these are the most interesting dimensions in capturing the vicissitudes of everyday experience. In this regard, it is noteworthy that although one can find terms to fit any region of the circle depicted in Figure 1 . the High NA and High PA octants are among the most densely populated areas within the space. Indeed, as we suggested earlier, the High NA octant is a particularly rich source of affect descriptors, containing dozens of commonly used terms. The High PA, Pleasantness, and Unpleasantness octants also contain numerous terms, but the four remaining octants (Engagement, Disengagement, Low PA, Low NA) are more sparsely populated and contain relatively few good markers.
We emphasize that we are not suggesting that this abundance of good markers qualifies these dimensions as basic in some absolute sense. Rather, our point is that because affect words are developed to describe highly significant feeling states, one reasonably can argue that the more densely populated regions in the space represent the areas of greatest interest in everyday life. It certainly is no accident that the High NA octant is particularly rich in descriptors, in that it subsumes several of the basic affects (e.g., fear, anger, contempt, disgust, guilt, shame) that have been postulated in classical models of emotion. This, incidentally, illustrates another important advantage of this particular conceptual scheme, namely, that it lends itself nicely to a more inclusive hierarchical structure in which each of the general dimensions can be decomposed into multiple discrete affects. Thus, the NA dimension can be subdivided into specific affects, such as fear, guilt, and anger, whereas PA can be subdivided into joy, interest, and so on (see Tellegen et al., in press; Watson & Clark, 1992a , 1997 Watson & Tellegen, 1985) .
The second general consideration concerns the Activation or Arousal dimension (which in Figure 1 is labeled Engagement vs. Disengagement) in the alternative scheme. As discussed previously, we believe that the bipolar Pleasantness-Unpleasantness dimension reflects important and intrinsic qualities of affective experience; as such, it is essential to any complete understanding of mood. We have found the Activation/Arousal dimension to be less compelling, for two reasons. First, because of a relative dearth of good marker terms, it is more troublesome to measure this dimension than any of the others in Figure I . Indeed, as Figures 2 and 3 illustrate, it has proven difficult to identify affectively neutral terms that fall directly on the hypothesized Activation axis. Because of this paucity of good markers, investigators who are interested in assessing Activation typically are forced to use valenced terms that are not clear, unambiguous measures of the dimension. For instance, Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998) included both a number of positively valenced items (e.g., alert, filled with energy, full of energy) and negatively valenced items (e.g.. stirred up, keyed up) in their measures of high Activation.
Second, in our own work we have sought to develop a conceptual-assessment scheme that is maximally robust and flexible and, therefore, can be used in both within-and betweensubjects analyses and in both state and trait ratings of affect. Although the concept of Arousal/Activation makes excellent sense when applied to short-term affect (especially ratings of current, momentary mood), its relevance to long-term individual differences in emotionality is less apparent. In this regard, it is telling that although investigators have explored related concepts such as Affect Intensity (Larsen & Diener, 1987) , there has been less interest in dispositional differences in Arousal per se (for discussions of the personality correlates of Arousal, however, see Larsen & Diener, 1992; Mehrabian, 1996) .
In contrast, the PA and NA dimensions lend themselves well to dispositional analyses and have been widely studied in this manner. Thus, trait measures of NA reflect stable individual differences in the tendency to experience aversive emotional states, such as fear, guilt, sadness, and anger, whereas trait PA scales assess characteristic differences in the experience of positive states, such as enthusiasm, confidence, and cheerfulness. Moreover, measures of these "Big Two" affective dimensions have been found to be strongly and systematically related to the "Big Two" traits of personality-Neuroticism and Extraversion-that have been included in virtually all major dispositional models (see Watson, Clark, & Harkness, 1994; Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman, & Teta, 1993) . Specifically, measures of trait NA are strongly correlated with Neuroticism but are more weakly related to Extraversion; conversely, measures of trait PA are more strongly related to Extraversion than to Neuroticism (for a review, see Watson & Clark, 1992b) . Indeed, on the basis of these strong and robust associations, Tellegen (1985) argued that Neuroticism and Extraversion could be relabeled Negative Emotionality and Positive Emotionality, respectively.
To document this point further, we examined relations between the Big Two of affect and the Big Two of personality in 12 samples with a combined N of 4,457. Respondents in all samples completed the trait NA and PA scales from the PANAS. In addition, the participants were assessed on the Neuroticism and Extraversion scales from one of the following instruments: NEO Five-Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992) , NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (Costa & McCrae, 1992) , NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1985) , Big Five Inventory (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) . and revised versions of scales originally developed by Goldberg (see Watson & Clark, 1992b) . To eliminate differences in metric across these various instruments, we standardized the scores on a within-sample basis and then combined them to permit a single overall analysis.
The resulting correlations are presented in Table 4 . As expected, trait NA correlated very strongly with Neuroticism (r = .58), whereas trait PA was strongly related to Extraversion (r = .51). In addition, trait NA correlated more moderately with Extraversion (r = -.25): similarly, trait PA correlated -.33 with Neuroticism. These latter correlations reflect, in part, the moderate overlap between Extraversion and Neuroticism (r = -.31). Indeed, after controlling for Neuroticism, the partial correlation between trait NA and Extraversion was only -.08; in parallel fashion, after controlling for Extraversion, the partial correlation between trait PA and Neuroticism was reduced to -.17.
Thus, the NA and PA dimensions show strong and systematic associations with the Big Two of personality. We again emphasize that these data cannot establish that these affect dimensions are basic in any fundamental sense. Our point, rather, is that this particular conceptual scheme offers an especially attractive framework to researchers who are interested in affect at both the state and the trait levels.
The Nature of PA and NA General systems of approach and withdrawal. We turn now to an examination of the basic functions and evolutionary significance of the PA and NA dimensions. Earlier we suggested that PA and NA represent the subjective components of more general biobehavioral systems. Specifically, the accumulating evidence increasingly indicates that fluctuations in these self-report dimensions reflect the operation of two broad, evolutionarily adaptive motivational systems that mediate goal-directed approach and withdrawal behaviors (Carver & White, 1994; Depue & Collins, in press; Depue, Luciana, Arbisi, Collins, & Leon, 1994; Kring & Bachorowski, in press; Tomarken & Keener, 1998) . The withdrawal system typically has been labeled the behavioral inhibition system (BIS; e.g., Fowles, 1987 Fowles, , 1994 ; in contrast, the approach system has been given a variety of names, including the behavioral activation system (e.g., Fowles, 1987) , the behavioral engagement system (e.g., Depue, Krauss, & Spoont, 1987) , and the behavioral facilitation system (BFS; e.g., Depue et al., 1994) . To avoid any confusion with the dimensions included in the affect circumplex (e.g.. Engagement is listed as a dimension in Figure 1 ), we will refer to it as the BFS. A brief examination of these broader motivational systems will help to clarify the basic functions of the NA and PA dimensions. First, accumulating evidence suggests that the self-report NA dimension represents the subjective component of the withdrawaloriented BIS (e.g.. Carver & White, 1994; Tomarken & Keener, 1998) . In behavioral terms, the essential purpose of the BIS is to keep the organism out of trouble-that is. it inhibits behavior that might lead to pain, punishment, or some other undesirable consequence. Put differently, the primary function of this system is to help organisms avoid aversive stimuli. Gray (1987) called the BIS a "stop, look, and listen system" to emphasize how it redirects attention toward the environment (see also Fowles, 1994) . According to Gray. BIS activity focuses maximum attention on analyzing environmental stimuli, especially novel stimuli that could potentially signal danger. The BIS also has a strongly anticipatory quality: It promotes a vigilant scanning of the environment for potential threats and motivates the organism to move cautiously until safety is indicated.
Viewed in this light, it becomes clear that the negative feeling states associated with the NA dimension promote the vigilant apprehensiveness that is characteristic of the BIS. For instance, feelings of nervousness and fear motivate organisms to escape from situations of potential threat or danger. Similarly, anticipatory states of apprehension and worry help individuals to avoid settings that previously have been associated with pain and punishment. In a related vein, feelings of revulsion and disgust help to keep organisms away from noxious and toxic substances (see Depue & Iacono, 1989; Depue et al., 1987; Fowles, 1987 Fowles, , 1994 Tellegen, 1985) .
In contrast, variations in self-rated PA reflect the operation of the BFS (e.g.. Depue et al., 1987 Depue et al., , 1994 Tellegen, 1985; Tomarken & Keener, 1998) . The BFS is an appetitive system of behavioral approach rather than avoidance or inhibition: It directs organisms toward situations and experiences that potentially may yield pleasure and reward. Fowles (1987) described it as "a reward-seeking or approach system that responds to positive incentives by activating behavior" (p. 418). Similarly, Depue and Collins (in press ) characterized it as a system of "behavioral approach based on incentive motivation" (p. 8). They further noted that this incentive motivation "is associated with a unipolar dimension of positive affect, ranging from strong presence to complete absence at the extremes" (p. 7). The basic adaptive function of the BFS is to ensure that organisms obtain the resources (e.g., food and water, warmth and shelter, the cooperation of others, sexual partners) that are essential to the survival of both the individual and the species.
The positive feeling states associated with the PA dimension appear to serve both as a motivating source of-and as an affective reward for-these goal-directed behaviors. That is, enhanced feelings of energy and vigor increase the subjective perception that one is capable of performing these behaviors; in a related vein, elevated levels of enthusiasm and confidence increase the expectation that goal-directed activities ultimately will be rewarded. Thus, these types of positive feelings generally can be expected to increase the likelihood that goal-directed activities will be performed. Once they are performed, heightened feelings of pleasure and delight represent the affective reward for a successful performance. On the other hand, low levels of PA are associated with depressed affect (e.g., Clark, Watson. & Mineka, 1994 : Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998 : Tellegen, 1985 .
The adaptive importance of this affective reward is most clearly manifested in the melancholic subtype of major depression, which is characterized by either a "loss of pleasure in all, or almost all, activities" or a "lack of reactivity to usually pleasurable stimuli" (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. 384). Because they fail to receive sufficient reward for their efforts, individuals with melancholic depression become unmotivated and show a pervasive reduction in goal-directed behaviors (see also Kring & Bachorowski, in press; Tomarken & Keener, 1998) . Note that this link to melancholic depression further demonstrates that deficits in PA and the BFS play a crucial role in certain types of mood disorder, a point we return to subsequently.
Neurobiological basis of NA and PA. Although our understanding of the underlying biological substrates of these systems remains somewhat sketchy, considerable progress has been made in recent years. Davidson, Tomarken, and their colleagues have conducted an important line of research examining hemispheric asymmetry in the prefrontal cortex (for a review, see Tomarken & Keener, 1998) . This research was stimulated by preliminary evidence indicating that unilateral lesions or sedation of the left frontal lobe were associated with a "depressive-catastrophic" reaction, whereas lesions or sedation of the right frontal area were associated with either a relatively neutral mood or elevated PA (e.g., Gainotti, Caltagirone, & Zoccolotti, 1993; Starkstein & Robinson, 1989 ). This evidence led Davidson and Tomarken to explore more systematically the affective implications of resting anterior asymmetry (Davidson, 1992; Davidson & Tomarken, 1989 : Tomarken & Keener, 1998 . Their data have consistently demonstrated that happy, euthymic individuals tend to show relatively greater resting activity in the left prefrontal cortex than in the right prefrontal area; conversely, dysphoric and dissatisfied individuals display relatively greater right anterior activity.
It has proven difficult to isolate the specific effects of left versus right prefrontal activity in these studies. Some recent evidence, however, suggests that PA primarily reflects the level of resting activity in the left prefrontal area, whereas NA is more strongly and systematically associated with right frontal activation (Bruder et al., 1997; Davidson, 1992; Tomarken & Keener, 1998) . On the basis of these data, Davidson and Tomarken have linked frontal asymmetry to the operation of the BIS and BFS. Specifically, they argue that resting levels of left prefrontal activation reflect individual differences in the approach-oriented BFS and the subjective experience of PA. Tomarken and Keener (1998), for instance, argued that "relative left frontal activation is associated with heightened appetitive or incentive motivation, heightened responsivity to rewards or other positive stimuli, and greater contact with those features of the external environment that are rewarding or engaging" (p. 395). Conversely, they posited that resting levels of right frontal activation reflect individual differences in the withdrawal-oriented BIS and the subjective experience of NA. Summarizing across these findings, Tomarken and Keener (1998) concluded that "these lateralized systems not only influence approach and withdrawal motivation but also the positive and negative emotions that are often linked to approach and withdrawal" (p. 403).
Furthermore, each of the major ascending monoaminergic neurotransmitter systems-norepinephrine, serotonin, and dopamine-has significant projections to the frontal cortex (GoldmanRakic, Lidow, & Gallagher, 1990) , indicating that this analysis can be extended to the subcortical level. Indeed, Gray (1982 Gray ( , 1987 has written extensively on the neutral substrate of the BIS, arguing that it consists of (a) the septo-hippocampal system (SHS), (b) the closely related Papez loop, (c) ascending monoaminergic pathways (including both noradrenergic pathways that connect the SHS to the locus ceruleus and serotonergic projections that link it with the raphe nuclei), and (d) neocortical structures that are in reciprocal communication with the SHS (see Gray, 1987, Figure 3) .
In contrast, the ascending dopaminergic system has been strongly implicated in the operation of the BFS and in the subjective experience of PA. This system arises from cell groups located in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and has projections throughout the cortex (Depue & Collins, in press; Depue et al., 1994; Le Moal & Simon, 1991) . Consistent with the data reported by Davidson and Tomarken, these cortical projections tend to be concentrated in the left hemisphere, with a particularly strong asymmetry in the frontal region (Tucker & Williamson, 1984) . A substantial body of evidence has established that the dopaminergic system mediates various approach-related behaviors, including heightened appetitive motivation, enhanced behavioral approach to incentive stimuli, and increased engagement with the environment (e.g., Depue & Collins, in press; Depue et al., 1994; Depue & Iacono, 1989; Stellar & Stellar, 1985; Wise & Rompre, 1989) .
In an interesting extension of this literature, Depue et ai. (1994) related this system to stable individual differences in affectivity. Depue et ai. administered biological agents known to stimulate dopaminergic activity and then measured the strength of the system's response across various individuals. They found that various measures of dopaminergic activity were strongly correlated with individual differences in trait PA but were unrelated to trait NA. Depue et al. noted further that "many of the behavioral and hormonal effects of dopamine activation are significantly influenced by genetic variation in dopamine cell number, including those dopamine cell groups in the VTA" (p. 486), implicating interindividual variations in the number of dopamine neurons as a possible source for hereditary differences in trait PA. In other words, variation in dopamine cell number in critical regions such as the VTA may lead some individuals to be more energetic, enthusiastic, and confident than others.
Distinctive Qualities of PA and NA
Distribution of PA and NA scores over time. Once the divergent tasks of the BIS (i.e., to keep organisms out of trouble) and the BFS (i.e., to mobilize organisms to obtain vital resources) are understood, it is easy to see why the NA and PA dimensions display some strikingly different properties. As one example, positive and negative moods show markedly different distributions over time. Specifically, analyses of daily mood fluctuations in both American respondents (Zevon & Tellegen, 1982) and Japanese respondents (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1984) demonstrated that NA scores were positively skewed and leptokurtic (i.e., more "peaked" than a normal distribution), with most of the scores packed within a relatively narrow range slightly below the mean. However, extremely elevated scores also occurred with some regularity in both samples and appeared to constitute "emergency reactions" to ongoing crises. Thus, consistent with the basic functions of the BIS, NA scores remain relatively low in the absence of threat or danger but quickly elevate in response to potential emergencies.
In contrast, Zevon and Tellegen (1982) and Watson et al. (1984) both found that PA scores were roughly symmetrical and slightly platykurtic, indicating that the distribution was somewhat "flatter" (i.e., showing less of a peak around the mean) than that of a classic normal curve, showing substantial variability across a very broad range. This markedly different distribution reflects the fact that the BFS primarily is concerned with approach and appetitive behaviors rather than potential threats, crises, and emergencies. As Clark and Watson (1988) put it, "PA ebbs and flows with the daily tide of events, whereas NA crashes upon us in times of trouble only to disappear just as quickly when the storm is over" (p. 305).
Endogenous rhythms in PA. The distinctive functions of the BIS and BFS also clarify why PA-but not NA-is strongly influenced by endogenous rhythms that reflect the operation of internal "biological clocks" (Clark, Watson, & Leeka, 1989; Thayer, 1978 Thayer, , 1989 ). As we have discussed, NA and the BIS primarily serve to keep organisms away from danger. Consequently, this system is designed to be highly reactive in character. That is, NA levels should be elevated in response to threat (e.g., being threatened by a predator) but remain at relatively low levels in the absence of danger. Because environmental threats tend not to occur at regularly scheduled times (e.g., predators do not plan their attacks for 2 p.m.), there is no compelling reason why animals should experience a sudden upsurge of fear or anger at a particular hour of the day (such as 2 p.m.). In fact, in the absence of any clear benefit to the organism, it is evolutionarily disadvantageous to experience high-activation states such as fear and anger, in that they (a) consume more energy, thereby increasing the amount of food that is necessary for survival and (b) place greater strain on bodily resources, thereby heightening the possibility of physiological exhaustion (e.g., Selye, 1976; Webb, 1979) . Accordingly, endogenous rhythms should exert little systematic influence on the NA dimension.
In contrast, the approach and appetitive behaviors mediated by the BFS (e.g., eating, drinking, socializing, sexual activity) operate on an entirely different logic. These behaviors obviously must be performed with a certain frequency, but it rarely is necessary that they be emitted at a particular time or in a specific context; for instance, although humans need to eat periodically to survive, it is not essential that we eat a bagel every night at midnight. Consequently, the BFS possesses considerable flexibility in determining exactly where and when these approach behaviors are performed.
When should these appetitive behaviors be encouraged? Again, from an evolutionary perspective these high-activation states should be performed when there is some clear benefit to the organism-that is, when reward is reasonably likely and the risk of danger is relatively low (e.g., Webb, 1979) . Note, moreover, that the availability of resources-and the relative risk of harm-often can be predicted in advance as a function of time. For instance, foraging is much more likely to be rewarded when food is relatively plentiful (e.g.. during the summer) than when it is extremely scarce (e.g., during the dead of winter). Similarly, in species with poor night vision, foraging will be more frequently rewarded during the daylight hours than after dark. Because the probability of risk and reward can be specified in advance, PA and the BFS should be subject to preprogrammed biological cycles that vary widely across species but are highly consistent within species. The basic function of these endogenous rhythms is to increase the likelihood that species members will be active and energetic at those times when resources arc plentiful and the relative risk is low; conversely, animals should tend to be sluggish and inactive when resources are scarce or when the threat of danger is high (for related discussions, see Clark et al.. 1989; Depuc et al.. 1987; Webb. 1979) .
These considerations lead to the expectation that PA and the BFS should show preprogrammed endogenous cycles (a) over the course of the day and (b) across the seasons of the year. With regard to the latter, many animal species do, in fact, show substantial variations in appetitive behaviors (such as reproduction) and in general activity level across the seasons of the year (e.g.. Kasper & Rosenthal, 1989; Tamarkin. Baird, & Almeida, 1985) . Seasonal variation is seen most dramatically in hibernation, which involves a marked reduction in body temperature and the metabolic rate, thereby serving as an extremely powerful mechanism for energy conservation (e.g.. Mrosovsky. 1988) . Hibernation per se. however, ordinarily is confined to small mammals who normally cannot survive long without eating; larger mammals (including humans) can thrive much longer without eating and therefore have no need for this mode of adaptation (Mrosovsky, 1988) . Nevertheless, many researchers have noted the striking parallels between hibernation and seasonal affective disorder, an illness that is characterized by an atypical depression during the late fall or winter; this depression often is followed by a hypomanic episode during the spring or summer (Kasper & Rosenthal, 1989; Mrosovsky, 1988) . These clear parallels led Kasper and Rosenthal (1989) to suggest that this fall/winter depression originally developed as a means of conserving energy during times of food scarcity.
Beyond these suggestive data regarding seasonal affective disorder, however, we currently lack compelling evidence regarding seasonal variations in PA. In contrast, it has been clearly established that PA shows a robust and well-defined circadian cycle over the course of the day (e.g., Clark et al.. 1989; Thayer, 1987 Thayer, . 1989 . Specifically, PA scores tend to rise throughout the morning and then remain elevated throughout the rest of the day; they then decline substantially during the evening. NA, however, shows little or no systematic rhythm over the course of the day.
This circadian rhythm is quite robust and is broadly characteristic of the PA dimension. To document this latter point, we report data from the two momentary samples that previously were described in conjunction with Tables 2 and 3 . Both samples rated their current momentary mood on the general Negative Affect scale of the PANAS as well as four specific scales from the PANAS-X that have been shown to be strong markers of the PA dimension in momentary mood data: Joviality (e.g., happy, enthusiastic, energetic). Self-Assurance (e.g., confident, daring), Attentiveness (e.g., alert, concentrating), and Fatigue (e.g., sleepv. sluggish). Scores on this last scale were reversed in these analyses to facilitate comparison with the other PA markers.
Recall that participants in the first sample (Moment Data-SMU) were 226 SMU undergraduates who rated their current mood on the PANAS-X once per day for 45 days (these analyses are based on an overall N of 9.951 observations; M = 44.1 per respondent). Each day, they made their ratings during one of five different time periods, which alternated on a prearranged, random schedule: rising (within 1 hr of getting up), morning (any time before noon), afternoon (noon-6 p.m.), evening (any time after 6 p.m.), and retiring (within 1 hr of going to bed). Once again, to eliminate all between-subjects variance, we standardized these ratings (M = 0, SD = 1) on a within-subject basis and collapsed them across all participants. Finally, we computed mean affect scores for seven 3-hr time periods (6 a.m.-9 a.m., 9 a.m.-noon, etc.).
Participants in the second sample (Moment Data-Iowa) were 120 University of Iowa undergraduates who rated their current mood over the course of a week (these analyses are based on a total N of 6,233 observations: M = 51.9 per respondent). Each day. the participants completed both a rising and a retiring mood rating. In between, they rated their momentary mood every 2 hr; note, however, that each participant was allowed to choose either an even-hour schedule (e.g., 10 a.m., noon) or an odd-hour schedule (e.g., 9 a.m., 11 a.m.) to accommodate differences in classes and lifestyle. As in the first sample, we standardized these ratings on a within-subject basis and then collapsed them across all participants, finally, we computed mean scores for each 2-hr block (7 a.m.-9 a.m.. 9 a.m.-l 1 a.m.. etc.).
These mean scores are displayed in Figures 4 (SMU sample) and 5 (Iowa sample). Consistent with previous research. Negative Affect scores showed a small amount of relatively unsystematic variation in both samples. In contrast, the four PA marker scales all exhibited a strong and systematic circadian cycle. Indeed, although there were some minor differences (e.g., Attentiveness scores peaked earlier than scores on the other scales in the Iowa sample), it is clear that they all are being carried along the same circadian wave and follow the same basic rhythm (most notably, they all are quite low at the beginning and end of the day). Thus, these data demonstrate that patterned cyclicity is broadly characteristic of the PA dimension. Animals exhibit a number of different circadian rhythms, many of which emanate from the suprachiasmic nucleus of the hypothalamus (e.g., Moore & Eichler. 1972) . To date, variations in PA have been clearly linked to two of these endogenous cycles. First, a number of studies have reported average body temperature curves that bear a striking resemblance to the circadian rhythm of PA (e.g., Froberg, 1977; Thayer, 1989) . Moreover, studies that have examined these variables concurrently have found a close correspondence between the two rhythms (e.g., Thayer, 1987 Thayer, , 1989 . We have replicated these findings in our own data. Specifically, the participants in the Iowa sample measured their body temperature orally after completing their mood ratings at each assessment. As before, these measures were standardized on a within-subject basis and collapsed across respondents. Figure 6 is a plot of the mean scores for NA, PA (both assessed with the PANAS), and body temperature at hourly intervals over the course of the day. Consistent with previous research, PA and body temperature showed similar (but certainly not identical) cycles over the day: Both tended to be quite low early in the morning and late at night, with elevated levels during the day. Indeed, across the 18 hourly intervals, the correlation between mean PA and body temperature was .79 (p < .001, two-tailed). Second, PA scores vary systematically as a function of the individual's location on the sleep-wake cycle. For instance, Clark et al. (1989) demonstrated that mean PA scores tended to be particularly low if the respondent had recently risen or was preparing to retire, regardless of the time of day. As a further illustration of this point, 104 of the SMU participants (N = 4,494 assessments) indicated their exact rising time (as well as the time they completed their mood ratings) at each assessment, allowing us to compute the time elapsed since rising. As in earlier analyses, we standardized the data on an intraindividual basis and then computed mean scores as a function of the elapsed time since rising; these were calculated on an hourly basis (i.e., 0-1 hr, 1-2 hr, 2-3 hr, etc.). The resulting data for the Negative and Positive Affect scales of the PANAS are depicted in Figure 7 .
Except for a sudden, unexplained increase at approximately 12 hr post-rising, NA scores showed little systematic variation. In marked contrast, PA scores varied dramatically as a function of time since rising. PA levels were quite low within the first hour of awakening; after that, they increased steadily and began to approach maximum levels at approximately 3 hr post-rising. PA levels continued to increase for several more hours, however, until reaching their zenith at roughly 8 hr post-rising. They then began to decline-first slowly, then more rapidly. It is noteworthy that the peak PA level occurred at the approximate midpoint between the termination of the previous night's sleep (i.e., rising) and the onset of the next night's sleep (i.e., retiring). It therefore appears that one can predict momentary PA scores reasonably well as a function of the temporal proximity of sleep (see also Clark et al., 1989) . At a conceptual level, this link between sleep and PA is hardly surprising, in that the sleep-wake cycle reflects the same evolutionary pressures (most notably, the principle that energy should be expended judiciously) and evolved as a highly efficient means of energy conservation (e.g., Berger & Phillips, 1995; Webb, 1979) . In fact, it may be useful to view slow-wave sleep (which is associated with a marked reduction in metabolic rate and a substantially reduced rate of energy consumption) as the true nadir in the naturally recurring cycle of BFS fluctuation.
We can extend this analysis further by noting that most of the mood disorders also are characterized by well-defined cycles and episodes that give rise to recurring rhythms over time. In the bipolar disorders, for instance, the individual fluctuates between well-defined episodes of mania (or hypomania) and depression. Similarly, major depression tends to occur in episodes that may spontaneously remit over time (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) . Moreover, the melancholic subtype of depression frequently shows a marked diurnal pattern in which the symptoms are worst in the morning and then lessen in strength over the course of the day. Finally, as discussed earlier, the mood disorders can show a marked seasonal pattern, as is exhibited in seasonal affective disorder (Kasper & Rosenthal, 1989; Mrosovsky, 1988) .
It hardly is coincidental that these circadian and seasonal trends parallel those observed with PA. Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests that melancholic depression and bipolar disorder represent marked perturbations in PA and the BFS (see Depue et al., 1987; Depue & Iacono, 1989; Mineka et al., 1998; Tomarken & Keener, 1998) . That is, mania and hypomania typically are episodes of extremely elevated PA (i.e., the individual feels elated and euphoric and has tremendous energy, confidence, and enthusiasm), whereas melancholic depression is characterized by a profound anhedonia and an almost total inability to expert- ence pleasure. Furthermore, various lines of evidence also link the mood disorders to disturbances in the sleep-wake cycle (e.g., Kupfer, 1976 Kupfer, , 1995 Vogel, Neill, Hagler, & Kors, 1990; Wu & Bunney, 1990) . For instance, sleep in individuals with melancholic depression tends to be relatively shallow, with increased Stage 1 and reduced amounts of slow-wave sleep. Furthermore, the architecture of REM sleep is seriously disturbed in many depressed individuals; most notably, REM episodes occur (a) unusually early in the non-REM-REM cycle and (b) with unusual frequency during the early hours of sleep (e.g., Kupfer, 1976) . Finally, sleep deprivation is one of the most effective short-term treatments for depression (Wu & Bunney, 1990) . Thus, PA, sleep, and the mood disorders all appear to reflect common underlying mechanisms in which energy is expended and conserved in recurring cycles.
Implications for the independence of NA and PA. Even this brief review is sufficient to demonstrate that NA and PA are highly distinctive dimensions that reflect separate underlying systems. As we discussed earlier, however, these two dimensions are not entirely independent of one another, and a brief examination of these systems may help to explain why this is so. As we have seen, NA responses represent "emergency reactions" to ongoing crises. Cannon (1929) established that emergency responses of this sort were accompanied by numerous autonomic changes that were designed to promote the efficient mobilization of energy and to permit a very high level of sustained physical activity. It is noteworthy that many of these changes involve temporarily shutting down nonessential functions (such as digestion) so that available resources can be mustered for maximum effort. In parallel fashion, emergency states of high NA likely are associated with a temporary shutdown of the currently nonessential PA system. This, in turn, leads to the specific prediction that states of intense NA should be associated with low levels of PA, which is supported by existing data (Diener & Iran-Nejad, 1986; . More generally, it seems reasonable to propose that these two adaptive systems must be in communication with-and be influenced by-one another.
Conclusion
Our goal was to establish that PA and NA are extremely useful explanatory constructs that help to clarify important properties of mood ratings and that reflect more general biobehavioral systems. We reiterate that the evidence does not establish that NA and PA are the only "basic" dimensions of affect. Similar arguments could be used to support complementary conceptualizations, including both alternative dimensional approaches and models emphasizing the importance of discrete affects. We encourage future researchers to use a variety of approaches in seeking to understand this extraordinarily complex domain of human experience.
